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DETOXIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND DEFERRAL 
The Democratic Failures of GM Regulation 
Rocque Reynolds* 
The implied promise of liberal democracies in a state of pluralism is 
that difference will be addressed. This article argues that this promise 
has not been met in the case of GM regulation, despite 30 years of 
discussion and debate. Rather than attribute this failure to the 
insurmountable logic of uncertainty, this article blames it on the 
strategies of detoxification, displacement and deferral employed by 
the legislature and the Gene Technology Regulator to avoid 
addressing substantive issues of social meaning in relation to GM 
technology. The article concludes that the Gene Technology Regulator 
has failed to fulfil the broad legislative mandate granted under the 
Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth), thereby rendering the Regulatorʼs 
position largely irrelevant.  
The Day of the Triffids, writes LJ Hurst, is about ‘permanent horror … an eternity 
of irrecoverable pain. The only way of escaping it is not to have it start.’1 It is this 
sense of a lost moment, of risk fulfilled, of lessons unlearned, that the anti-Genetic 
Modification (GM) lobby continues to confront, even as many of us are rendered 
immobile by indecision, ignorance or ennui — the risk seems so distant, the 
uncertainty insuperable and the rhetoric (of both sides) unconvincing. Even the 
products of GM are uninspiring. No one believes GM food will solve world hunger 
(do they?). And replacing pesticides with GM crops is at best a good economic 
choice for some farmers. It is easier to paper over the twin fissures of risk and 
uncertainty with food labels and licensing regulations than to face the possible 
horror of an inescapable end. It is easier to discount terminator genes and food 
security as conspiracy theories than to consider what it might take to control them. 
Caught in this ‘tragic individualisation’, as Beck has called this lived experience of 
risk,2 we do not know who to trust: the GM Regulator and expert committees; the 
anti-GM lobby, which has taken on the role of prime-time entertainment, warning 
the masses of ‘frankenfoods’ and the evils of Monsanto; or the pro-GM lobby, 
which has portrayed regulatory hurdles as safety guarantees (‘GM plant varieties 
are more rigorously tested than non GM varieties’), plant quarantines as marketing 
strategies (organic food contains ‘no more than 0.9 per cent GM material’), and 
genetic engineering as just another form of biotechnology (like yeast). Difference is 
obliterated in the rhetoric of choice, and the greatest choice of all is presented as an 
ethical one between rich city dwellers on the one hand and drought-affected farmers 
and the world’s hungry on the other.  
                                                           
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Technology, Sydney. 
1  Hurst (2006). 
2  Beck (2006), p 8.  
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The fact that this debate continues today and in this form should be a cause for 
wonder. GM technology has been practised since the early 1970s, GM crops have 
been grown in Australia since the late 1980s, there have been commercial releases 
of GM crops since 1996, and GM foods have been on supermarket shelves for more 
than a decade. We could discount the GM debate as simply a difference of opinion, 
but this raises an important issue. The central GM regulatory instrument in 
Australia, the Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 2000, is almost a decade old 
and state moratoria against the release of certain GM plants have been imposed, 
lifted and reaffirmed during this time. The management of difference is the raison 
d’être of democratic institutions under conditions of pluralism and, whether one 
mobilises a liberal, republican or procedural model of democracy,3 the complex 
legitimacy claims of democratic decisions bear witness to one implied promise — 
not that you will agree with the decisions but that differences in matters of social 
value have been addressed in making those decisions.  
Rather than accept that it is ‘just a difference of opinion’, commentators have 
tried to explain the experience of tragic individualisation and its relation to 
democratic decision-making in different ways. For Beck, tragic individualisation 
bears witness to the insuperability of uncertainty and the legitimacy claims of those 
experts who seek to overcome it:  
As a consequence everyday life in world risk society is characterised by a 
new variant of individualisation. The individual must cope with the 
uncertainty of the global world by him or herself. Here individualisation is a 
default outcome of a failure of expert systems to manage risks. Neither 
science, nor the politics in power, nor the mass media, nor business, nor the 
law or even the military are in a position to define or control risks rationally. 
The individual is forced to mistrust the promises of rationality of these key 
institutions. As a consequence, people are thrown back onto themselves, they 
are alienated from expert systems but have nothing else instead … 
responsibility for the decision on genetically modified foods and their 
unforeseeable, unknowable long-term consequences is ultimately dumped on 
the so-called ‘responsible consumer’. (Consumer choice rules.) The appeal to 
‘responsibility’ is the cynicism with which the institutions whitewash their 
own failure.4  
As Beck argues, there is an inescapable logic of uncertainty, and no amount of 
scientific or mathematical calculation, risk assessment or risk management can 
avoid it. The fascination with uncertainty and the desire to overcome it might itself 
be called irrational, and any regulator who stakes a legitimacy claim on doing this is 
bound to fail.5  
                                                           
3  See Habermas (1998), pp 135–45.  
4  Beck (2006), p 8.  
5  Beck (2006), pp 7–8. To give an Australian example, when Monsanto argues that the 
discovery of GM canola on the roadside cannot be called ‘contamination’ because 
‘these events were anticipated by the [Federal] Government Regulator when they 
approved GM canola for use’, the boundary between rationality and hysteria becomes 
blurred. See ‘GM canola found on roadside: Cropwatch’, ABC Western Victoria, 
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Francine Rochford takes this further: tragic individualisation, she argues, is not 
just a failure of expert systems but is also a risk-shifting strategy of the state:  
The individualisation of risk is not only indicative of a ‘failure’ of expert 
systems (as Beck has suggested), but also consistent with risk-shifting 
strategies … Individuals are called upon to be responsible for the risks of 
global calamity — potential risks of genetic engineering are thrown back on 
the ‘informed consumer’, the risks of global warming are the sum of market 
forces based on individual decisions to consume … and so on.6 
Rochford equates such risk-shifting with other individualisation strategies of the 
neo-liberal state and reminds us of the specifically legal way in which the lived 
experience of risk is created and maintained.  
While Rochford focuses on the regulatory strategies of the state and the effects 
of regulation, Richard Hindmarsh’s excellent social history of the GM debate 
focuses on the substance of the debate, and looks at how social meaning and 
regulatory forms have been constructed around this debate. Utilising a private-
interest analysis, Hindmarsh challenges the democratic legitimacy claims of 
regulatory decision-making in Australia on the basis that GM regulation excludes 
matters of social value from consideration, and that this exclusion results from the 
successful ‘agenda-setting’ strategies of a pro-GM ‘bioelite’.7 Drawing on earlier 
work with Charles Lawson, Hindmarsh also repeats his criticism of the Gene 
Technology Regulator on the basis that the scientific language used by the 
Regulator masks the value-laden nature of her decisions. Hindmarsh concludes his 
social history with a call for regulatory reform, which will usher in a new era of 
‘biocivics’ characterised by greater consultation, accountability, transparency and 
environmental sustainability in GM decision-making.8 Like many private interest 
analyses, Hindmarsh’s social history does not specifically interrogate the agency of 
the state in making these decisions.  
In this article, I bring the strategies of the state and the substance of the GM 
debate into closer relationship in seeking to understand the tragic individualisation 
of the lived experience of risk. I argue that the intractable nature of the debate bears 
witness to the incommensurability of two competing paradigms of risk: one in 
which risk is co-produced in the practices of industrial technology; the other in 
which risk is a reified and unavoidable challenge. I argue that, rather than endorsing 
either paradigm at the expense of the other (as a private-interest analysis might 
expect), the legislature has resorted to regulatory design, community confusion and 
political ‘buck-passing’ between the Commonwealth and the states to avoid 
responsibility for addressing this difference. In particular, the Commonwealth has 
established a regulatory structure that shifts responsibility for decision-making from 
the legislature to an independent regulator. I argue that, rather than use this 
                                                                                                                                         
26 November 2008, 
www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/11/26/2429844.htm?site=westernvic.  
6  Rochford (2007), p 175.  
7  Hindmarsh (2008) p 267.  
8  Lawson and Hindmarsh (2006).  
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legislative mandate to create, express or realise a public purpose,9 the Regulator has 
instead used it to circumscribe the Regulator’s own responsibility and 
accountability. These strategies of detoxification, displacement and deferral, as I 
call them, mean that the substantive issues of social value relating to GM 
technology still have not been addressed by the Commonwealth, the states (apart, 
arguably, from Tasmania) or by the Gene Technology Regulator, despite years of 
public debate. As a result, any legitimacy claims based on the passage of legislation 
arising from these debates are questionable.  
Two Paradigms of Risk  
In Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity,10 first published in Germany in 1986, 
the year of the Chernobyl disaster, Ulrich Beck provides one of our most enduring 
analyses of risk. In many ways, Beck’s analysis of risk and the risk society has 
displaced those post-war stories of industrial fatalism, such as The Day of the 
Triffids, which found in the progress of science and technology the seeds of our 
own destruction. The following brief outline of Beck’s analysis of the risk society 
will help us situate the substantive arguments of the GM debate and understand the 
different paradigms of risk employed by the pro- and anti-GM lobbies.  
For the sociologist Beck, the threat of destruction is not the end of the matter 
but the beginning of the question. If the threat of destruction is immanent in the 
modes of industrial production, he asks, how does society sustain itself — how is it 
that the distribution of risk both challenges and maintains the social order?  
Beck distinguishes risk from the older concept of dangers, or those hazards of 
bygone times. Hazards or dangers were once personal and external; they assaulted 
the senses or put demands on the soul (for bravery or courage, for example). They 
were calculable and attributable, and liability flowed from their cause. Risk, on the 
other hand, is a ‘systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced 
and introduced by modernisation itself’; risks are ‘politically reflexive’11 and come 
to us clothed in the theoretical and normative statements of knowledge 
communities.   
Beck’s analysis of risk transcends the dichotomy between the ‘naïve realism of 
hazards’12 (where risk is an identifiable, separate and measurable entity — defined 
as the product of the likelihood of an event and its possible impact) and the 
constructivist analysis of risk associated with Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavski, 
for whom risk is a ‘social construction’ informed by a personal sense of danger.13 
While the naïve realism of hazards is frozen in the inescapable logic of uncertainty, 
the social construction of hazard evaporates in the subjectivity of perception.  
Beck instead looks at the lived experience of risk — of who creates it, lives it, 
defines it, legitimates it and bears responsibility or liability for it. As Adam and Van 
Loon put it, in discussing Beck’s contribution to risk analysis: 
                                                           
9  Fisher (2007) pp 28–30, citing Cook (1996), p 16.  
10  Beck (1992). 
11  Beck (1992), p 21 (italics in original).  
12  Beck (1995a), pp 60–61. 
13  Douglas and Wildavsky (1982); Douglas (1985). 
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It means that we need to go beyond the concept of risk and technology as 
mere social constructs and grasp instead how specific technologies are lived 
as future creating social praxis and in what way particular risks are 
experienced, perceived, defined, mediated, legitimated and/or ignored.14 
Becks’ lived experience of risk is contingent, ambivalent and open to other 
possible futures. In this, his analysis differs profoundly from those founding myths 
of modernity and of post-war fiction that repeat the horrors of industrial fatalism 
(which generates risk)15 and Weberian bureaucracy (which administers and 
disperses it).16 Rather, Beck insists that technological progress, risk and hazard must 
be received as mystified modes of social self-encounter and as signposts of our own 
history and ‘its corrigibility’: 
Large-scale technological hazards can and must be apprehended and 
deciphered as mystified modes of social self-encounter, twisted outwards and 
reified. They are objectified memories of suppressed social-human 
imperfection and responsibility, projected onto nature and technology. It is 
not something external but itself that society encounters in the hazards that 
convulse it; and the reigning paralysis can only be overcome in so far as 
society apprehends the hazards as signposts of its own history, and to its 
corrigibility.17  
This does not simply mean that the question of whether society ‘needs’ GM 
plants and food is contestable. More importantly, Beck insists that the debate about 
GM risk is a debate about people and social relationships rather than about an 
abstract form of technology that appears and operates in a social vacuum, apart 
from or external to the actors and social structures which experience, create, 
distribute and administer risk. As Elizabeth Fisher has said, for Beck, ‘technological 
risks have become a focal point for arguing for more general reforms in how the 
state governs in a liberal democracy as well as one of the catalysts for the rise of the 
new social movements’.18  
For the sociologist Beck, laws and regulations are complicit in the creation and 
maintenance of a social order that distributes and administers risk in a particular 
way. At times, he describes them as ‘scandalous examples’ of ‘organised 
irresponsibility’:19 
                                                           
14  Adam and Van Loon (2000), p 6.  
15  Beck (1995a), pp 58–69. For Beck, the narrative of industrial fatalism not only avoids 
the question of what is produced, it also grounds and justifies a principle of ‘organised 
irresponsibility’ in relation to its effects: if society is to blame for the generation of risk, 
then nobody (or anybody) can be held responsible for its effects. 
16  Beck (1995a), p 58 conjures ‘Compte to Adorno, Marx to Luhmann, to name but a few’. 
See also Robins (2002). 
17  Beck (1995a), p 159.  
18  Fisher (2007), p 11. 
19  Beck (1995a), p 63. For an application of the concept of organised irresponsibility in the 
Australian context, see Healy (2000) and Salleh (2006). For an excellent account of the 
relationship between common law concepts of liability and risk assessment, see 
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Laws … constitute an assent, incomprehensibly condensed into paragraphs 
and authorities, to everything new in science, economics and technology. The 
pruning of details legitimates the main trend. There is no better way of 
symbolically detoxifying the reality of the danger, which precisely for this 
reason is rendered irreversible.20 
He points to the way in which laws and regulations simultaneously legitimate risk 
and delegitimate dissent in such a manner as to render all resistance idle: 
It is not the specialist logic of technology that compels us to accept hazards, 
but the system of organised non-liability, which renders all resistance idle, 
ultimately turning that which controls the production of hazards — law, 
science, administration, policy — into its accomplice.21 
It is easy to misunderstand Beck here. He is not suggesting that there is 
anything inherent in the form of laws and regulations that condemns them to 
irresponsibility and industrial fatalism — in fact, distributing risk and responsibility 
is one of the functions of law. Rather, he is insisting that it is law that distributes 
risk and responsibility, not something inherent in either technology or nature (which 
have other, different roles or effects — such as a capacity to spread, or reproduce or 
feed or fuel the planet).22 
I will consider the substantive issues raised by the GM debate against Beck’s 
sociological description, but first I must consider the use of the terms ‘pro-’ and 
‘anti-GM lobbies’, which I have already used somewhat crudely. As Latour has 
said, ‘there are many contradictory ways for actors to be given an identity’,23 and 
instead of pro- and anti-GM lobbies I might have referred to ‘seed companies and 
greenies’, or ‘GM and non-GM farmers’, or ‘growers and consumers’, or 
‘regulators and stakeholders’. Any one of these figurations might have framed the 
question differently. However, by using the terms ‘anti-GM’ and ‘pro-GM 
lobbyists’, I have left the question of why they lobby in abeyance while still 
                                                                                                                                         
Rochford (2007), p 183, who argues that although the courts have not adopted risk 
management strategies, ‘the modern and pervasive ideas of risk subtly infuse our 
commonsense calculations of risk’. 
20  Beck (1995a), p 60. In this paragraph, Beck transcends the traditional distinction 
between law as facilitative and law as expressive. To the extent that regulatory 
structures both define the regulatory sphere and create the conditions for its acceptance, 
it is both facilitative and expressive. For a discussion of the application of this 
traditional distinction in regulatory theory, see Morgan and Yeung (2007), Ch 1. 
21  Beck (1995a), p 160.  
22  Compare Giddens (1999), p 10, who argues that: ‘Where a society hasn’t got effective 
means of dealing with organised irresponsibility, the result isn’t always that no one is 
held responsible. On the contrary, the price of manufactured uncertainty is probably 
closely associated with the emergence of “litiginous” society. Where a common 
“contract of responsibility” has broken down, culpability can be found anywhere. Here 
indemnity has effectively been separated from causality.’ For Giddens (1999), p 5, risk 
arises when a decision has to be made; liability arises from the making of that decision. 
23  Latour (2005), p 22. 
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creating a shared field of debate (the use of GM technology) and a broad common 
audience (GM legislators and regulators). 
The anti-GM lobby largely comprises organised groups — with Greenpeace, 
the GeneEthics Network and the Network of Concerned Farmers being the most 
visible in Australia. Each of these groups has a different focus. Greenpeace has 
grown out of the environmental movement, and organisation around GM (or genetic 
engineering, as Greenpeace calls it) is simply one branch of its activities. 
GeneEthics produces the ‘GM Free Zone’ notices one sees in cafes and restaurants 
and is ‘a non-profit educational network of citizens and kindred groups’. It 
addresses human, animal and plant GM, although food and plant GM remain its 
primary focus. Finally, the Network of Concerned Farmers is a small group of 
farmers, which promotes itself as a non-strident body concerned about the 
implications of GM technology for farmers.  
All these groups produce, distribute and promote GM information, which is 
often internationally sourced. Although each group comes to the GM debate from a 
different direction, the issues they raise are remarkably similar. I shall therefore 
examine one of the most popular anti-GM films, The Future of Food,24 as 
representative of the type of issues raised by the anti-GM lobby. In a review, Jason 
Silverman called this film ‘a comprehensive and chilling example of anti-GMO 
rhetoric’.25 
The concerns raised in the film can be grouped into three categories. The first 
covers the broadest socio-economic concerns relating to GM technology, including 
the control or ownership of food and genetic resources. Under this banner, 
questions of food security, the role of Monsanto Ltd, changes in agrio-cultural 
practices (such as the introduction of contract farming), the ‘commodification’ of 
life through patenting, and the influence of GM companies on research funding and 
academic freedom are raised.  
The second category covers issues related to gene flow, threats to 
biodiversity,26 the cost of GM containment and liability for GM contamination. 
‘GM technology is the new cane toad’ is the catchcry for such concerns.  
The third category of concerns relates to the alleged lack of utility of GM 
technology for either farmers or consumers,27 the possible ill-effects of GM 
technology on plant and animal vigour, and problems relating to regulation. Under 
this category, food safety and human health issues can be raised but rarely are, 
although animal health is often discussed.  
                                                           
24  This film is regularly screened by anti-GM lobby groups. The film was made by Lily 
Films and written, directed and produced by Deborah Koons Garcia, who ‘hoped it 
could be a combination of [Rachel Carson’s classic environmental text] Silent Spring 
and [Gino Pontecorvo’s 1965 film] The Battle of Algiers’: Silverman (2004b).  
25  Silverman (2004a). 
26  The argument is that GM contamination may lead to the destruction of certain land 
races, which in turn will have a negative effect on biodiversity.  
27  The argument is that GM crops are not tested for viability and effectiveness before 
release, and existing contractual and legislative provisions relating to misrepresentation 
are possibly ineffective. 
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It would be easy to dismiss the film and the breadth of issues it raises as a 
cynical exercise to garner support for the anti-GM cause from a broader range of 
people. However, I would suggest that, taken within the context of Beck’s analysis 
of the risk society, the anti-GM position can be understood better as a coherent 
response to new technology that is at once a rejection of industrial fatalism, a call to 
be politically reflexive, a debate on the desirability, necessity, effectiveness and 
cost of GM technology, and an acceptance of the contingency of the lived 
experience of risk.28 The effect of this complex construction of risk is that it shifts 
the focus of the GM debate away from an abstract concern with the form of the 
technology itself to the specificity of who benefits from the use and development of 
GM technology, who bears the risk of that technology, what the technology is used 
for and how that risk is managed. 
Within this construction of risk, the role of Monsanto Ltd is central. Websites 
such as ‘Monsanto Watch’29 report on Monsanto activities, and there appears to be a 
level of demonisation about Monsanto Ltd, which probably heads the list of 
companies that anti-GM lobbyists love to hate. There is a rational reason for the 
anti-GM lobby’s focus on this company. Monsanto Ltd owns the technology for 
88 per cent of the total GM crop area in the world;30 this technology is applied to 
two out of the world’s five leading food crops;31 and the technology is almost 
exclusively used to make crops resistant to Monsanto-owned pesticides and 
herbicides, especially the world’s leading herbicide, Roundup. Monsanto’s decade-
long promises to produce drought-resistant or other desirable pipeline products have 
so far come to nothing. For the anti-GM lobby, the question is whether the benefits 
achieved by Monsanto and individual farmers in using GM herbicide- and 
pesticide-resistant crops is outweighed by the risk of contamination and the social 
consequences of such use.32 The anti-GM lobby is always conducting something in 
the nature of a rough cost-benefit analysis of existing products and practices, and 
has a high level of disbelief in relation to promises of imaginary or pipeline 
products. 
This concern with Monsanto and its products is reflected in the submissions 
received by the Gene Technology Regulator in relation to applications for licences 
                                                           
28  This is not to deny that anti-GM organisations may have a private interest in 
maintaining an anti-GM stance in order to attract funds, donations and membership but, 
to the extent that they cannot exclude themselves from the risk society, they too will be 
subject to scrutiny and reflection. 
29  www.monsantowatch.org/ 
30  Glover (2008), p 3. Glover relies on figures published by Monsanto and ISAAA, the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agricultural Bio-tech Applications: 
http://km.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fsn/docs/Glover%20thesis%20summary.pdf.  
31  Monsanto produces GM soybean, maize, cotton and canola. The top five crops in the 
world are wheat, maize, rice, barley and soybean. Canola is one of the top 18 crops in 
the world. See Leff et al (2004).  
32  As Anthony Giddens (1999) has pointed out, risk can be beneficial and benign, at least 
for some: GM technology in crops, for example, has proved to be of great benefit to 
Monsanto Ltd; today, it tops the World’s Top Seed Companies at the expense of 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, which has maintained its traditional plant-breeding 
techniques.  
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for release of GMOs, either for trial or commercial release. More submissions are 
made by the anti-GM lobby in regard to Monsanto Australia Ltd licence 
applications than similar applications by Bayer CropScience Pty Ltd or the 
Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation (CSIRO), both of 
which have comparable numbers of licences.33 More submissions are made by the 
anti-GM lobby in relation to food crops than to non-food crops such as carnations 
and cotton. Finally, more submissions are made by the anti-GM lobby in relation to 
herbicide- and insecticide-resistant traits than in relation to other traits which are in 
the trial stage only, such as drought resistance, water retention and the colour of 
carnations. For the anti-GM lobby, there appears to be a real difference between a 
blue GM rose and a food crop containing GM pesticides.  
This pattern of submissions also indicates that the anti-GM lobby’s position in 
relation to GM technology is more complex than the call to a ‘GM Free Future’ 
would suggest. Greenpeace, GeneEthics and the Network of Concerned Farmers all 
call for a GM Free Future, but they each emphasise different strategies for 
achieving it — from individual responsibility to institutional accountability to 
agricultural solutions. Thus Greenpeace supports consumer action against the 
consumption of GM foods, exhorts farmers ‘not to plant GM seeds’ and supports 
food labelling laws to promote consumer choice.34 GeneEthics wants ‘the 
precautionary principle, scientific evidence and the law rigorously applied to all 
proposed uses of genetic manipulation (GM) technologies and their products’.35 It 
challenges the scientific claims of the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator on 
the basis that the office fails to establish standards and repeatability as part of its 
testing processes. The Network of Concerned Farmers is highly critical of the 
effectiveness of current risk-management strategies for maintaining crop identity as 
well as the lack of utility of current GM products. They demand better containment 
and segregation protocols as well as assessment and accountability for the 
(in)effectiveness and (in)utility of GM products. What unites these three 
organisations under the banner of a ‘GM Free Future’ is their belief that if 
individuals took responsibility for their futures, and if institutions acted accountably 
and transparently, and if the ineffectiveness of existing risk management strategies 
and GM products were recognised, then the world would indeed be GM free.  
Some may accuse the anti-GM lobby of peddling fear in the spaces of 
uncertainty, but the irony of risk management makes fear a risky strategy — the 
more effective the anti-GM lobby is in demanding effective risk management which 
avoids catastrophic consequences, the more irrelevant they become in the eyes of 
                                                           
33  As at 31 December 2008, Monsanto had 12 current licences for release into the 
environment including five commercial release licences plus seven surrendered 
licences; CSIRO had eight current and 10 surrendered licences; and Bayer CropScience 
had eight current, including two commercial release licences plus one surrendered 
licence. University of Queensland came next with only four current licences and one 
surrendered licence for release into the environment.  
34  See Greenpeace Australia Pacific’s website: 
www.greenpeace.org/australia/issues/GE/solutions/corporate/ge-free and 
www.greenpeace.org/australia/issues/GE/powerholders. 
35  ‘Our Vision’, www.geneethics.org/about. 
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the public and the more prone to accusations of scaremongering they become.36 The 
anti-GM lobby cannot rely on the generation of fear in the spaces of uncertainty 
without risking its own credibility. 
The pro-GM lobby is structured quite differently from the anti-GM lobby. It 
comprises two distinct groups that do not work closely together, although there are 
obvious ties between them. The first group is the agricultural industry, which uses 
GM products. This includes research organisations funded by grower levies such as 
the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC); private biotechnology 
companies; and industry bodies such as CropLife Australia, the National Farmers’ 
Federation Ltd, the Grains Council of Australia and Agrifood Awareness Ltd 
(which was established specifically to promote GM technology). This group is 
highly organised and has successfully positioned itself as the leader in finding 
regulatory solutions to the ‘GM problem’. GRDC, for example, developed industry-
wide plans and protocols for managing crop segregation, and the grains industry 
organisations worked together to produce Delivering Market Choice with GM 
Canola (known as the ‘Single Vision’ document), which eventually formed the 
basis for lifting or partially lifting the GM moratoria in New South Wales and 
Victoria.37 
The second group of the pro-GM lobby comprises individual scientists, 
commentators and journalists who support GM technology, although they do not 
work directly with GM technology or use it. The group is consciously ideological in 
its approach, and one of the most prolific writers in this group is online journalist 
Jennifer Marohasy, who is a Fellow at the Melbourne-based Institute of Public 
Affairs and Director of the Australian Environment Foundation. The Institute of 
Public Affairs (IPA) is a well-known conservative think tank that claims to be the 
first ideologically based (free-market) think tank in the world. The Australian 
Environment Foundation (AEF) describes itself as an environmental organisation 
that takes ‘an evidence-based, solution focused approach to environmental issues’.38 
They are committed to ‘evidence, choice, technology, management, diversity and 
people’, and were set up following an IPA conference in 2004. Although AEF has 
not succeeded in securing any government environmental grants as it had hoped to 
do at its inception,39 it has since that time run conferences sponsored by Monsanto, 
Bayer CropScience, Auscott, Murray Irrigation Ltd and the Forest Industries 
Association of Tasmania. In addition, AEF has given environmental awards to the 
timber industry giant Gunns Ltd (and subsequently endorsed its contentious 
                                                           
36  As Giddens (1999), p 5 points out, the debate in risk society always risks falling into 
accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and cover-ups on the other.  
37 An industry report prepared under the Single Vision Grains Australia process, published 
July 2007, www.afaa.com.au/pdf/Delivering_Market_Choice_with_GM_canola.pdf. 
The process was named after Single Vision Grains Australia, an independent body 
funded by GRDC from 2005 to June 2007 to provide strategic leadership for major 
issues facing the grains industry, including GM technology. The primary document 
produced by the organisation was Towards a Single Vision for the Australian Grains 
Industry 2005–2025, March 2004.  
38  AEF website: www.aefweb.info/index.php. 
39  Personal communication with founding member.  
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Tasmanian timber industry developments) and to a hunters’ organisation, Field and 
Game Australia, for activities undertaken by them in relation to their industrial 
activities.  
Talking to members of AEF, it appears that their driving force is a belief that 
the environment must be managed ‘more sensibly’ (‘less red tape’), and that people 
and industry must ‘come first’. On this basis, the AEF endorses GM crops, the 
abolition of native vegetation legislation, decreased immigration and Japanese 
whaling while rejecting ‘man-made’ climate change and the Victorian 
Environmental Assessment Council’s plan for the Murray-Darling basin. The AEF 
is registered as an environmental group for the purposes of receiving tax-free 
donations. 
At first sight, it may appear that the AEF is a classic example of what Peter 
Drahos and John Braithwaite call an ‘astroturf ‘ (as opposed to a grass-roots) 
organization — that is, a corporate front group which presents itself as an NGO.40 
However, comments by current and past members of both the IPA and AEF, as well 
as the wording of party endorsements of biotechnology, suggest a more complex 
construction. Members of these groups tend to speak of GM technology in the 
abstract as just another form of new technology: ‘This new technology’ will help 
maintain Australian ‘agricultural competitiveness’, and it is ‘wrong’ for 
organisations ‘such as Greenpeace’ to stymie the development of ‘this new 
technology’.41 Pro-GM commentators tend to conflate the concepts of GM 
technology and the broader concept of biotechnology (which includes technologies 
as old as yeast and beer-making) in a further act of abstraction. When asked why 
they would fight for a technology that is effectively controlled by one company, I 
was told: ‘It is not who owns the technology but whether the technology is good or 
bad.’ I was also told that the fact that Monsanto technology accounted for 88 per 
cent of global GM acreage was simply an indication of ‘how good’ the Monsanto 
products must be. 
Organisations such as the IPA and AEF identify themselves as much in 
opposition to anti-GM groups as for GM technology per se. In some cases, this is 
because they portray themselves as better, more honest, more scientifically rigorous 
and rational environmentalists. In other cases, it is because they affect a stance of 
being anti-environment and committed to the hard business of running a country 
and economy. In addition, while the pro-GM lobby tends to avoid the concrete 
question of who benefits from owning and controlling GM technology, it does extol 
the benefits of GM products, actual and potential. Thus, in recent years, GM cotton 
growers have adopted a strategy of making submissions to the Gene Technology 
Regulator in support of licence applications for the release of GM cotton. More 
commonly, pro-GM lobbyists refer to the potential benefits of pipeline products 
such as drought-resistant wheat. 
There are other important differences between the pro- and anti-GM lobby 
approaches. The pro-GM lobby relies on the narratives of industrial fatalism to 
                                                           
40  Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), p 489. 
41  Personal communications with AEF and IPA current and past members. Some early 
members report that they left the AEF because they did not agree with the ideological 
approach taken.  
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justify the inevitability of technological progress and its collateral damage. For the 
pro-GM lobby, technological progress represents a battle between nature and 
human ingenuity … risk is a confrontation with uncertainty and risk taking is 
human ingenuity in action. In the rhetoric of the pro-GM lobby, risk is not 
something that is produced and distributed, but is something to be confronted. Risk 
might be minimised and managed, but the confrontation is inevitable so long as one 
is human. What is significant here is that, in the discourse of risk-taking, risk and 
uncertainty are reified, even fetishised, and their origins are obscured. Such 
reification also grounds the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘perceived’ risk that is 
mobilised to discount broader socio-political concerns relating to GM technology.  
The discourses of the pro- and anti-GM lobbies represent two paradigms of 
risk. For the anti-GM lobby, risk is co-produced in the practices of industrial 
technology and the question of who benefits and bears the cost of this risk is central 
to the question of what should be produced and by whom. For the pro-GM lobby, 
on the other hand, risk is reified and unavoidable; our willingness to confront it is a 
sign of personal (moral) strength; and our duty to manage it is a call to human 
ingenuity. Paradoxically, as we shall see, the coexistence of these competing 
paradigms led to a surprisingly broad initial acceptance of the Gene Technology Act 
2000 (Cth) and the establishment of the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator.  
Detoxification, Displacement and Deferral: The Avoidance Strategies 
of the Legislature 
The call to address difference is the raison d’être of democratic decision-making, 
so it is not surprising that the passage of the Gene Technology Act was preceded by 
considerable public debate. The history of this debate and the passage of the 
legislation have been examined before, most recently and comprehensively by 
Richard Hindmarsh, so I will not repeat the exercise here.42 What is important to 
note, however, is that the passage of the legislation and the establishment of the 
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator were initially supported, to a surprising 
extent, by both the pro- and anti-GM lobbies. Both groups were in favour of a 
stronger, more independent regulator to replace the non-statutory, voluntary Gene 
Manipulation Advisory Committee (GMAC), which had been praised for its 
standard-setting but criticised for its inadequate monitoring and compliance 
procedures.43 Significantly, both groups also initially agreed that licensing decisions 
made under the Act should be based on a ‘risk assessment of the health and safety 
of people and of the environment’, and that the Regulator should not consider 
‘marketing concerns’, which were to be dealt with by the states — which retained 
the right to impose a moratorium on the release of certain GMOs on this ground.  
This agreement was based on a misunderstanding, which arose from the fact 
that each side mobilised a different paradigm of risk and therefore understood the 
impact of the Act differently. Furthermore, it was based on an implied promise that 
substantive matters of social value could still be debated — either by the Office of 
                                                           
42  Hindmarsh (2008).  
43  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional 
Services (2000), p 152. GMAC itself had replaced the voluntary codes adopted by 
research scientists and laboratories in the early years of GM research. 
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the Gene Technology Regulator or in the states. The anti-GM lobby appears to have 
assumed that a ‘risk assessment’ would provide a cost-benefit analysis of the risk 
and that the Regulator would therefore be led to conclude that any benefit from 
GMOs would be outweighed by the risk to the health and safety of people and the 
environment. In addition, it applauded the exclusion of ‘marketing concerns’ from 
the Regulator’s mandate on the basis that this meant that the Regulator would not 
be influenced by the desire of companies such as Monsanto to benefit from 
exploiting GM technology. Conversely, the pro-GM lobby appeared to believe that 
the Regulator’s risk assessment would only consider ‘real’ risk as opposed to 
merely ‘perceived’ risk, and therefore find that GM crops were safe in contradiction 
to both alarmist populist propaganda and apparent consumer resistance. Both the 
pro- and anti-GM lobbies were prepared to continue the debate on ‘marketing 
concerns’ at the state level.  
The significance of this apparent agreement should not be under-estimated. 
Even today, it is common for the Commonwealth and the Regulator to base 
legitimacy claims on this ‘agreement’, which they represent as having emerged 
from more than a decade of debate and consultation with stakeholders and the 
community. This ‘agreement’, however, was illusory and the debate on substantive 
matters was never resolved — except, arguably, in Tasmania.  
Within a traditional regulatory constitutional framework, the question of 
whether GMOs should be released into the environment is one that challenges the 
usual categorisations. As a complex and divisive social issue with numerous 
stakeholders and significant redistributive effects, the release of GMOs is typical of 
those issues that ‘should’ be dealt with by broad democratic and accountable bodies 
such as parliament. On the other hand, as a complex technical problem requiring 
expert evidence, standard-setting and monitoring, it is characteristic of the types of 
problems that ‘should’ be left to expert bodies and regulators.  
These different characterisation of the GM debate are reflected in two ideal 
models of risk regulation, which Elizabeth Fisher has called the ‘rational-
instrumental’ model and the ‘deliberative-constitutive’ model.44 The rational-
instrumental model construes public administration as an instrument of the 
legislature based on a transmission belt theory of administrative law. Under the 
rational-instrumental model, the Regulator is given discrete tasks within a narrow 
mandate with limited discretion. The deliberative-constitutive model, on the other 
hand, seeks to meet the complexities of risk regulation by granting significant 
discretion to an independent regulator, who ‘helps to create, to express and to 
realise … public purpose’.45 Under the deliberative-constitutive model, the 
legislature sets out broad principles and constitutes a body that has responsibility 
for realising the public purpose expressed in these principles. 
The regulatory structure established by the Gene Technology Act can be 
understood as an almost ideal type of deliberative-constitutive model. The functions 
of the Regulator are extensive and broadly defined under section 27. Not only is the 
Regulator responsible for issuing licences for dealing with GMOs, but is also 
required to draft policy principles and guidelines, codes of practice and technical 
                                                           
44  Fisher (2007).  
45  Fisher (2007), pp 28–30, citing Cook (1996), p 16.  
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and procedural guidelines. The Regulator is required to perform an educative role 
for the public and other regulatory agencies, promote harmonisation of risk 
assessment across different agencies, and monitor international practice and 
maintain international links in relation to GM regulation. Rather than simply 
requiring the Regulator to be a technical expert in relation to gene technology, these 
functions constitute the Regulator as the key figure in all aspects of GM regulation, 
from policy development at a domestic and international level to public 
communication and good administrative practices, both now and in the future.  
In relation to licensing, the legislative mandate of the Regulator is also broad. 
Section 51, for example, requires the Regulator to take into account ‘any risks, 
including any risks to the health and safety of people and the environment’ when 
preparing a risk assessment (italics added). Furthermore, the Act does not define 
key terms such as ‘risk’, ‘risk assessment’ or ‘risk management’. As the 
Explanatory Memorandum, Gene Technology Bill 2000 (Cth) stated: ‘It is intended 
that the Regulator will issue detailed guidelines regarding the process for risk 
assessment and risk management, following extensive public consultation on these 
matters.’ 
Significantly, the Explanatory Memorandum recognised that the ‘possible risks 
of the technology’ included not only matters relating to health, safety and the 
environment but also ‘broader, non-scientific concerns … about the use of the 
technology including ethical, social and moral concerns relating to the impact of 
“humans playing God” by using gene technology’. The Explanatory Memorandum 
explained the objectives of the legislation as follows:  
The objective of Government action is to protect the health and safety of 
people and to protect the environment by identifying risks posed as a result of 
gene technology and by managing those risks through regulating certain 
dealings (or activities) with GMOs. 
Against the Government’s broad goal, and to address the shortfalls in the 
current regulatory arrangements, the Government’s objectives are to … (inter 
alia) continue a science based approach to the assessment of risks but 
including capacity for formal consideration of broader issues such as 
ethics …46 
In support of this purpose, the Act provided for the establishment of a number 
of committees, including a technical advisory committee, an ethics committee and a 
community consultation committee. In all matters, including licensing, the 
Regulator was required to consult widely.  
What is striking about this regulatory structure is that it effectively deferred 
many of the policy decisions relating to these ‘broader issues’ and shifted 
responsibility for making them from the Commonwealth legislature to the new 
independent regulator. Furthermore, by delegating responsibility for defining the 
nature of risk, its assessment and management to the Regulator, the question of 
which paradigm of risk should be employed was not resolved. As we shall see in 
the next section, this deferral and displacement were not really effective — the 
Regulator has proved to be very adept at side-stepping these responsibilities.  
                                                           
46  Explanatory Memorandum, Gene Technology Bill 2000 (Cth), p 14.  
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Perhaps the most audacious avoidance strategy employed by the legislature in 
relation to GM regulation, however, arises from the ‘buck passing’ between the 
Commonwealth and the states in the imposition and eventual lifting of state 
moratoria on the release of certain GMOs. Again, the history of this matter has been 
dealt with by others, and I will not repeat it here.47 Suffice to say that the 
Constitutional limits on Commonwealth legislative power meant that the successful 
establishment of a national system of gene technology regulation was dependent on 
the states agreeing to pass corresponding state legislation. Tasmania, in particular, 
refused to agree to this unless it was given the power to prevent the release of 
GMOs in that state either by ‘opting out’ of the Commonwealth legislation or by 
imposing a moratorium on the release of GMOs in Tasmania. Such a power had the 
potential to subvert any perceived pro-GM position held by the Commonwealth 
government of the day.  
The Commonwealth refused to provide for an opt-out clause, but did agree to 
allow individual states to impose limited moratoria on the release of GM crops. 
Under section 21 of the Gene Technology Act, the Ministerial Council was 
empowered to issue policy principles in the form of disallowable instruments 
relating to ethics and other matters. Section 57 provided that the Regulator was not 
entitled to issue a licence that was inconsistent with such a policy principle. Before 
the Bill was passed, section 21 was amended to specifically provide that the 
Ministerial Council could issue a policy principle recognising areas, if any, 
designated under state law for the purpose of ‘preserving the identity of … GM 
crops and non-GM crops’ for ‘marketing purposes’: s 21(1)(aa). In due course, the 
Gene Technology (Recognition of Designated Areas) Principle (Cth) 2003 was 
issued.48 
Internationally, the coexistence of licensing systems and moratoria is one of 
the distinctive features of the regulation of gene technology, and distinguishes it 
from other environmental regulatory systems. Perhaps only nuclear energy has a 
similarly complex regulatory structure.49 The Australian scheme reflects but 
reverses the European regulatory structure. While the relevant European 
Community Directives permit the licensing of GMOs for ‘marketing purposes’, the 
                                                           
47  See Ludlow (2004). 
48  By tying the moratorium to crop identity and segregation for marketing purposes rather 
than allowing a general opt-out clause for states, the provision is thought by some to be 
consistent with Australia’s international obligations under the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures included in Annex 1 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation opened for signature 
15 April 1994 (entered into force 1 January 1995). See Senate Community Affairs 
Committee (2000), Ch 6 for a discussion of the ‘Tasmanian situation’ and the ‘opt-out’ 
option. See also the ‘EU biotech case’, European Communities — Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006 (Final Panel Report) for the WTO’s 
position. 
49 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), pp 287–321 argue that the international regulation of 
nuclear energy has always been directed at the control of its use in warfare. The 
environmental aspects of nuclear resources, on the other hand, are regulated by 
individual states. 
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safeguard measures under these directives allow individual Member States to 
impose a provisional moratorium on the basis of ‘health and safety concerns for 
people or the environment’.50 Under the Australia scheme, by comparison, the 
Regulator may issue a licence for GM release if the release is found to be safe for 
the ‘health of people and the environment’, but the Act allows individual states to 
impose a moratorium for ‘marketing purposes’.  
Despite the narrow wording of section 21(1)(aa), it was enough to keep the 
promise of a possible moratorium alive and the Commonwealth successfully 
avoided the political fallout of supporting either side of the GM debate. The 
question of whether GM technology should be endorsed or adopted was kept alive 
but in abeyance by deferring and displacing the locus of debate. However, except in 
Tasmania, this debate has still not happened — either in the implementation of the 
moratoria or in their eventual lifting.  
State acts implementing moratoria were generally passed at the same time as 
the corresponding state legislation for the Gene Technology Act; their passage was 
based on political undertakings and election promises rather than on a rigorous 
debate about substantive matters and the purpose of the moratoria was explicitly 
about deferring the debate — the passage of the moratoria would ‘provide the 
community with time to evaluate the impacts of the introduction of GM crops on 
the marketing of non-GM crops’.51 Furthermore, their objects of legislation varied 
from state to state. While some states banned the release of GM canola or other 
prescribed crops, others banned GM food crops and others banned the release of 
GM plants generally.52 Queensland and the Northern Territory didn’t impose a 
                                                           
50  In the European Community, the regulation of GM plants and food is covered by 
Directive 90/220/EEC (‘Directive 90/220’ published in OJ of the EC No L 117 of 
08.05.1990, p 15) ‘On the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms’ (repealed on 17 October 2002) and Directive 2001/18 
(‘Directive 2001/18’ published in OJ of the EC No L 106 of 17.04.2001, p 1) ‘On the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing 
Council Directive 90/220/EEC’, which set out the administrative procedures for 
licensing GMOs for marketing in the European Community. Regulation 258/97 
‘Concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients’ (published in OJ of the EC No L 
43 of 14.02.1997, p 1) lays down similar administrative procedures for granting 
authorisations for the placing on the market of foods and food ingredients containing or 
consisting of GMOs. Article 16 of Directive 90/220 and Art 23 of Directive 2001/18 
provide limited safeguard measures that allow an individual Member State to impose a 
provisional moratorium on the release of GM products on the basis that it presents a risk 
to human health or the environment. This assessment must be based on ‘justifiable 
reasons’ (Art 16 Directive 90/220) or ‘new or additional information’ made available 
since the date of the consent and affecting the environmental risk assessment or 
reassessment of existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific 
knowledge (Article 23 Directive 2001/1 8).  
51  Gene Technology (New South Wales) Bill and Gene Technology (GM Crop 
Moratorium) Bill Second Reading Speech: NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, Wednesday 21 May 2001, (Ian Armstrong, Minister for Agriculture and 
Fisheries).  
52  Gene Technology (GM Crop Moratorium) Act 2003 (NSW); Control of Genetically 
Modified Crops Act 2004 (Vic); Genetically Modified Crops Free Areas Act 2003 
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moratorium at all. Not only was any hope of a national consensus defeated but the 
object of regulation and debate was being gradually fractured without debate. 
From 2006 to 2008, the moratoria in New South Wales,53 Victoria,54 
Tasmania55 and South Australia56 were reviewed (sometimes in a cursory fashion) 
and the moratoria were partially ‘lifted’ in New South Wales and Victoria, and 
maintained in Tasmania and South Australia. In Western Australia, the moratorium 
was ‘relaxed’ following a close state election in which the moratorium was a 
contentious issue. The Western Australian government has allowed limited trials of 
GM canola to take place, but all states other than Tasmania have allowed similar 
trials under their moratoria. The two major differences between those states that 
‘lifted’ the moratoria and those that maintained them was how they defined their 
object of review and their terms of reference. For those states that maintained the 
moratoria, the object was broadly defined as ‘GM technology in primary industry’ 
(Tasmania) or ‘GM crops’ (South Australia), and the review extended to 
considerations of health and safety of people and the environment as well as 
marketing purposes. For those that lifted the moratoria, the object of review was 
limited to ‘GM canola’ (for which the registrar had issued a commercial licence in 
2003) and the review was restricted to ‘marketing purposes’, defined as a question 
of ‘choice’. In an ironic twist, which completed the circle of avoidance by the states 
and the Commonwealth, these states did not include issues relating to the health and 
safety of people and the environment on the constitutional basis that these were 
‘Commonwealth concerns’ — even though, as we have seen, the Commonwealth 
had not addressed these issues substantively and nor, as we will see, did the 
Regulator.  
The development and passage of the Gene Technology Act provides a lesson in 
detoxification, displacement and deferral. The apparent agreement between the anti- 
and pro-GM lobbies did not represent an accord between the two sides as to 
whether either GM technology was a ‘good thing’, but rather pointed to the 
incommensurability of their competing paradigms of risk. This difference was not 
overcome in the debates surrounding the passage of the Act, but was displaced and 
deferred in the deliberative-constitutive model of the legislation and in the promise 
of a state moratorium. In this process, it was not the risks of GMOs that were 
symbolically detoxified by the laws and regulations developed by the 
Commonwealth, but the GM debate itself. When Beck speaks of the ‘industrial 
fatalism’ of the risk society, this no longer means (if it ever did) that the social 
origins and consequences of GM technology are invisible or incomprehensible; 
                                                                                                                                         
(WA); Genetically Modified Crops Management Act 2004 (SA); Genetically Modified 
Organisms Control Act 2004 (Tas); Gene Technology (GM Crop Moratorium) Act 2004 
(ACT).  
53  Independent Panel Report to the NSW Minister for Primary Industries (2007). 
54  Victorian Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (2007).  
55  Joint Select Committee, Parliament of Tasmania (2008).  
56  South Australia had a relatively small consultation which found ‘no compelling reason 
to lift the ban’: Press release, The Hon Ron McEwen, South Australian Minister for 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Minister for Forestry, 17 April 2008. 
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rather, it means that the locus for the debate over these origins and consequences 
have been displaced and deferred. 
Detoxification, Displacement and Deferral: The Avoidance Strategies 
of the Gene Technology Regulator 
There have been three Gene Technology Regulators appointed under the Gene 
Technology Act. The current regulator is Dr Joe Smith, who took office on 
23 March 2009. He replaced Ms Elizabeth Flynn, who acted in the position after the 
departure of the inaugural regulator, Dr Sue Meeks. Dr Smith released a new Risk 
Analysis Framework (RAF) on 20 May 2009, which replaces the Risk Analysis 
Frameworks of 2007 and 2005. The new RAF ostensibly gives a higher priority to 
protection,57 prevention,58 the precautionary principle59 and the role of the Ethics 
Committee60 than the 2005 and 2007 RAFs. However, the following analysis is 
based on the decisions of the Regulator made under RAF 2005 and 2007. Although 
three decisions have been made since the release of the new RAF, the fact that these 
decisions use the language of the old RAF instead of the new (eg ‘hazard 
identification’ is still used rather than the new ‘risk identification’) suggests that the 
impact of the new RAF so far has been negligible. I will note changes made by the 
new RAF as appropriate. 
It could be argued that there is nothing unusual in legislatures sidestepping 
unpopular or difficult decisions by providing a broad discretionary legislative 
mandate to an independent regulator. As Mark Jamison has commented, ‘regulators 
are sometimes scapegoats for unpopular policies and unavoidably become involved 
in shaping policies which they are supposed to implement’.61 It could even be 
argued that, in the case of GM technology, it is more appropriate for the Regulator 
to develop risk management and assessment procedures in accordance with 
international and industry standards than to leave this matter to a politically 
motivated legislature. Such arguments assume that independent regulators are by 
definition immune to popular or populist influence when determining the limits of 
their legislative mandate and that, if there is a problem of regulatory discretion, it is 
that the Regulator will overstep that limit rather than fail to realise it.62 However, 
this is not the problem that arose in relation to the Gene Technology Regulator.  
Although stakeholders, lobbyists, academics and other interested parties 
originally participated enthusiastically in the decision-making processes of the 
Regulator,63 it gradually became apparent that this participation was ineffective and 
that the range of issues that the Regulator excluded from consideration were legion. 
                                                           
57 Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009), p 4. 
58 Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009), p 50. 
59 Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009), p 8. 
60 Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009), p 19. 
61 Mark J Jamison (2005), p 1. 
62  From Discretionary Justice on, the concern of commentators has primarily been to 
confine, structure and check discretionary power rather than to seek its effective 
exercise. See Davis (1969).  
63  Up to 127 submissions were made in relation to early contentious cases. 
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On the basis that they were ‘outside the scope’ of the inquiry, the Regulator 
excluded from consideration philosophical and ethical issues,64 marketing issues,65 
the utility or benefits of GMOs,66 the extension of agriculture into new areas,67 the 
economic and environmental sustainability of areas,68 ‘agrio-cultural practices’,69 
the difficulty or effectiveness of segregating GM and non-GM crops,70 and health 
issues.71 Issues were also excluded on the basis that they were to be dealt with by 
another regulatory agency. 
Some of these exclusions, although related to important substantive issues, 
were not considered contentious. For example, given that the object of the Act is to 
‘protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment’,72 it was 
generally understood that issues relating to the control and ownership of food and 
genetic resources, the ethics of patenting ‘life’ and the extension of certain agrio-
cultural practices such as contract farming might be excluded on the basis that, at 
least in Australia, they do not relate to the health and safety of people or the 
environment, except in the most tenuous fashion. In other countries, of course, these 
issues may go straight to the heart of food security and health, and some interested 
parties continue to make submissions regarding these matters even today.  
On the other hand, other exclusions are contentious. The need to segregate GM 
and non-GM crops; the extension of new agricultural products into areas previously 
not used for these products; the fact that such extensions may cause harm to fragile 
                                                           
64  For examples of ethical and philosophical matters being excluded, see 047/2003; 
057/2004; and 058/2005. 
65  For examples of marketing matters being excluded, see 047/2003; 048/2003; 053/2004; 
054/2004; 055/2004; 057/2004; 058/2005; 071/2006; and 077/2007. 
66  For examples of the utility and benefits of GMOs being excluded from consideration, 
see 059/2006; 063/2005; 071/2006; 071/2006; 067/2007; and 080/2007. 
67  For examples of agricultural extensions being excluded, see 067/2006; and 077/2007. 
68  For examples of issues of sustainability being excluded from consideration, see 
081/2007, including increased herbicide: 069/2006. 
69  For examples of agrio-cultural practices being excluded from consideration, see 
071/2006; and 078/2007. 
70  For examples of the matters relating to segregation being excluded, see 048/2003; 
053/2004; 055/2004; 057/2004; 069/2006; 077/2007; 080/2007; and 081/2007.  
71  For an example of a health matter being excluded, see 054/2004. 
72  Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth), s 3. The definition of ‘environment ‘ under section 10 
of the Act is narrow insofar as it doesn’t explicitly include references to social, 
economic and cultural matters, even though these are specifically included in the 
definition of ‘environment’ under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s 528. Note, however, that the Gene Technology Act 
definition is an inclusive definition. Furthermore, the Act explicitly requires the 
Regulator to take these risks into account in preparing both risk assessments and risk-
management plans. Sections 47 provides that in preparing risk assessments the 
Regulator is required to take into account ‘risks posed by the dealing including any risks 
to the health and safety of people or risks to the environment.’ Section 51 provides that 
in preparing a risk-management plan (based on the risk assessment), the Regulator must 
‘take into account the means of managing any risks posed by those dealings in such a 
way as to protect the health and safety of people; and the environment’. (italics added) 
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environments such as tropical savannah or threaten the environmental sustainability 
of agricultural land are all issues that appear to be clearly within the jurisdiction of 
the Regulator insofar as they relate to the health and safety of people and the 
environment. However, the Regulator has consistently excluded these issues from 
consideration on the basis that they are ‘economic’ issues or that they are not 
‘unique’ to genetic technology. Both of these explanations are based on extremely 
restricted interpretations of the Regulator’s legislative mandate.  
The Regulator has argued that ‘economic’ issues are excluded from 
consideration on constitutional grounds: ‘Constitutionally States have retained 
responsibility for economic development within their jurisdictions.’73 In support of 
this argument, the Regulator refers to section 16 but this section does not exclude 
the Commonwealth from managing economic issues but rather provides that the 
states and Commonwealth have concurrent jurisdiction in this matter so long as the 
state has passed the necessary corresponding laws. Each state has done this. The 
Regulator also suggests that section 16 covers the state moratorium provisions 
(which are in fact covered by section 21, as we have seen above) and that to the 
extent that states have responsibility for marketing issues, any economic issues are 
excluded from the Regulator’s consideration.74 Not only does this elide the issues of 
marketing and economics, it confuses the relationship between the Regulator’s 
jurisdiction and the ability of the states to impose a moratorium on GM release. 
Under section 57, the Regulator must not issue a licence that allows the release of 
GMOs in an area recognised by a policy principle as designated GM free by state 
moratoria — that is, section 57 limits the geographical extent of the GM licence; it 
is not designed to limit the extent of the Regulator’s inquiry in making a risk 
assessment. Most importantly, though, the Regulator’s exclusion of ‘economic’ 
issues ignores the fact that most, if not all, of the health, safety and environmental 
issues that the Regulator is required to consider will have a economic component or 
impact. The Regulator’s narrow interpretation of the legislative mandate means that 
it is not only matters that are ‘purely economic’ which are excluded from 
consideration (whatever that might mean), but that many important environmental, 
health and safety issues that have an economic component (such as the extension of 
agriculture into sensitive tropical savannah) have also been excluded. 
Under the ‘uniqueness’ requirement, the jurisdiction of the Regulator has been 
limited by redefining the object of regulation through a radical abstraction. Instead 
of regulating GMOs, the Regulator has argued that what is being regulated is 
‘genetic technology’.75 In support of this radical abstraction, the Regulator points to 
the wording of section 3 of the Act, which provides that the object of the Act is to 
‘protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by 
                                                           
73  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13. Compare Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator (2009), pp 51 and 79, which also excludes economic issues from 
consideration but does not explain why. 
74  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13. 
75  Although Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009), pp 4 and 36 does not refer 
to the concept of ‘uniqueness’ it does maintain the same principle by providing that the 
‘focus of the assessment is whether modified properties of the GMO arising from gene 
technology increase the level of risk’.  
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identifying risks posed by or as a result of gene technology, and by managing those 
risks through regulating certain dealings with GMOs’ (italics added). The Regulator 
has interpreted this in such a way as to restrict consideration to risks that are 
‘unique’ to the GM status of the organism:  
At a practical level this has implications for the risks which the Regulator can 
consider. For instance, many risks posed by GMOs to agriculture are not 
unique to gene technology, eg land or water use … Similar risks may also be 
imposed by non-GM organisms.76 
Under this interpretation, risks relating to the effectiveness of crop segregation 
are excluded on the basis that crop segregation is important for many forms of 
agricultural practice and is not ‘unique’ to GM crops. The environmental effects of 
extending agriculture into marginal lands are excluded on the basis that the risk is 
not related to the ‘unique’ GM status of the organism. In applying the uniqueness 
requirement, the Regulator has ignored the fact that the consequences of crop 
contamination may vary according to whether the contaminating agent is or is not a 
GMO, or that it may be the specific gene modification in question that has allowed 
exploitation of marginal lands. If the pro-GM lobby fetishised risk, the Regulator 
has taken this further. The ‘uniqueness’ requirement allows the Regulator to 
transform genetic technology into an abstract quality of novelty, stripped of social 
and environmental consequences, and even of the object that carries it.  
From a strictly legal viewpoint, it is difficult to support the Regulator’s 
‘uniqueness’ interpretation, which not only leads to absurdities but is inconsistent 
with the wording of the objects clause. The objects clause requires the Regulator to 
identify those risks ‘posed’ by gene technology as well as those ‘resulting’ from 
gene technology. To pose is ‘to embarrass by a difficult question or problem’,77 to 
‘put [a person] at a loss; to confuse, perplex, puzzle, nonplus’.78 Gene technology 
might be said to pose known and unknown risks; indeed, it might be said to pose a 
risk in itself. There is nothing to suggest that the risks posed by gene technology are 
not the same as the risks posed by other forms of technology, or that the risks posed 
by gene technology must ‘result’ from gene technology — in fact, the clause 
contemplates that the two are different. The risks posed by gene technology are 
those posed by technology generally — and the Act requires the Regulator to 
consider them all.  
Applied in this way, the ‘uniqueness’ requirement leads to absurdities. If a GM 
plant is no weedier than its non-GM equivalent, then under the ‘uniqueness’ 
requirement the weediness cannot be managed because it is not ‘unique’ to the GM 
status of the plant. This is like saying that a Regulator cannot manage the pest-like 
qualities of a genetically modified cane toad if the gene modification only changes 
its colour. By abstracting the object of regulation in this way, the Regulator has 
                                                           
76  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13.  
77 Macquarie Dictionary.  
78 Oxford English Dictionary Online.  
REYNOLDS: DETOXIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND DEFERRAL 773 
 
redefined the role and limited the accountability of the Regulator to the most 
scientifically narrow of considerations.79 
Perhaps the most contentious exclusions are those based on the utility of 
GMOs. The utility of GMOs arises in many contexts: Does the use of GMOs reduce 
the use of pesticides or increase the risk of pesticide resistance? Does a particular 
GMO have adverse or beneficial effects on the health of animals or plants? Does 
the GM modification really increase yield? Is the possible benefit of drought 
resistance outweighed by the threat to traditional agrio-cultural practices? These 
types of assessments and balances lie at the heart of Beck’s risk paradigm, and 
many people from both the pro- and anti-GM lobbies may have assumed that one of 
the advantages of having an independent Regulator would be that these alleged 
benefits could be independently assessed. 
However, the Regulator excludes consideration of the possible benefits (or 
lack of benefit) of GMOs from the risk assessment on the basis that, like economic 
issues, they are ‘marketing issues’ to be left to the state. Such an exclusion, the 
Regulator argues, is necessary ‘to prevent economic considerations (eg cost-benefit 
analysis, market access and agricultural trade implications) from compromising the 
regulatory system’s focus upon the scientific evaluation of risk’.80 
This is a striking claim. There is simply nothing in the Act that suggests the 
Act is to have a solely ‘scientific’ focus. In fact, scientific input is equated with 
consumer, health, environmental and industrial input under sections 100, 101 and 
108 of the Act. The only other specific references to scientific knowledge in the Act 
occur in section 4 in relation to the precautionary principle (which provides that 
lack of full scientific certainty is not to be used as a reason to postpone effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation) and section 50A (which provides 
that the gaining of scientific or technical knowledge may be one of the reasons for 
applying for an experimental licence). The Regulator, it seems, has confused the 
general regulatory principle that decisions be ‘rational’ with a personal preference 
for ‘scientific’ decision-making. This cannot be correct — it is one thing to say that 
the Regulator’s decision must be ‘rational’; it is quite another to suggest that the 
only rational decision is a ‘scientific’ one. Besides providing a dramatic example of 
a Regulator limiting the legislative mandate, such an interpretation casts doubts on 
the rationality and transparency of the Regulator’s own decision-making processes.  
Under the Regulator’s interpretation, only ‘adverse effects’ can be considered 
in a risk assessment.81 This is unusual and out of step with international risk-
assessment practices. Even the Regulator acknowledges that classical economic risk 
analysis models include a consideration of the ‘benefit or utility against which the 
ultimate decision of acceptability of an action may be weighed against the risks of 
that action’.82 In addition, the risk analysis model of Standards Australia, AS/NZ 
                                                           
79  The Regulator has also effectively imported the concept of substantial equivalence in 
food regulation into the field of environmental protection.  
80  See Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13. Compare Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator (2009), p 12, which does not use the term ‘utility’ but also 
excludes cost-benefit analyses and only considers risks ‘in terms of adverse outcomes’. 
81  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13. 
82  Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), p 13.  
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4360:2004, on which the risk assessment framework of the Gene Technology 
Regulator is based,83 includes costs and benefits within its list of possible risk 
criteria.84 By excluding benefits and utility from the risk analysis, the Regulator not 
only strips the GMO of its social meaning but strips the risk assessment of any 
meaningful measure of risk acceptability or unacceptability. This is a particularly 
denuded naïve realism of hazard — more limited than even the pro-GM lobby’s 
reified risk as human challenge.  
In practice, the Regulator must have some standard against which to determine 
whether a risk can be ‘managed’ in accordance with section 56. When I raised this 
issue with the Office, I was told that it wasn’t a problem because ‘in practice’ the 
Regulator and the applicant keep negotiating to develop an acceptable risk-
management plan until either agreement is reached or the applicant withdraws the 
application.85 Such regulation by attrition is hardly consistent with the Act’s ideals 
of accountability and transparency. Furthermore, it makes it extremely difficult for 
unsuccessful applicants to appeal a licensing decision.86  
Laws and regulations create new legal entities and associate old entities in new 
legal ways. When the legislature conferred a broad discretionary mandate on the 
Regulator to develop risk-evaluation instruments and strategies, the legislature did 
not simply detoxify the GM debate for itself, it also shifted power to a new legal 
entity: the Regulator and the Office. However, the Regulator did not exercise this 
power to ‘create … express (and) … realise’ the public purpose, as the deliberative-
constitutive model of risk regulation might have expected, but instead used this 
power to circumscribe the Regulator’s own responsibility and accountability.87 
When the Regulator excludes substantive matters on the basis that they are 
economic issues ‘constitutionally retained’ by the states or because the Regulator 
has radically transformed the object of regulation to those risks ‘unique’ to genetic 
technology, the Regulator does not simply avoid the embarrassment of difficult 
questions, of discussion and debate ‘posed’ by GM plants and food; the Regulator 
also avoids responsibility for deciding these questions. The cost of this strategy is 
that it renders the Regulator largely irrelevant — a sad state for one who has the 
legislative mandate to be the key figure in the GM debate.88 
The problem of GM risk is not simply an issue of the incalculable logic of 
uncertainty but raises substantive issues about the origins and consequences of 
using GM technology. If we feel abandoned in the tragic individualisation of risk, it 
                                                           
83  As Beck has emphasised, risk evaluation is an international institutional practice created 
and legitimised by knowledge communities. The risk evaluation model adopted by the 
Regulator is thus claimed to be modelled on ‘internationally recognised risk analysis 
practice’ and based on the Australian Standard AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management. 
See Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007), pp i, 13.  
84  Risk Management, Australian Standard AS/NZ 4360:2004, pp 4, 15.  
85  Communication with author.  
86  Under section 179, only an applicant has standing to challenge a licensing decision. 
87  Fisher (2007), pp 28–30, citing Cook (1996), p 16. 
88  This can most readily be seen in the decrease in the number of submissions to the 
Regulator over time. The anti-GM lobby in particular has almost stopped participating 
in the submissions process.  
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is because these substantive issues still have not been addressed by the 
Commonwealth, the states or the Gene Technology Regulator — the implied 
promise of the Gene Technology Act that they have been has proved false. Instead, 
the GM debate has been detoxified, deferred and displaced in the avoidance 
strategies of the legislature and the Regulator, whose legitimacy claims have come 
to nothing.  
References 
Secondary Sources 
Barbara Adam and Joost Van Loon (2000) ‘Introduction’, in Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van 
Loon (eds), The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues in Social Theory, Sage. 
Ulrich Beck (1995) Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society, Humanities 
Press. 
Ulrich Beck (1995a) Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, trans Amos Weisz, Polity Press. 
Ulrich Beck (2006) ‘Living in the World Risk Society’, A Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture, 
15 February. 
Ulrich Beck (1992) Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, trans Mark Ritter, Sage. 
Peter L Bernstein (1996) Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, John Wiley and Sons.  
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos (2000) Global Business Regulation, Cambridge University Press. 
Rachel Carson (1962) Silent Spring, Houghton Mifflin.  
Brian J Cook (1996) Bureaucracy and Self Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public 
Administration in American Government, John Hopkins University Press. 
Kenneth Culp Davis (1969) Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, Louisiana State University 
Press.  
Mary Douglas (1985) Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences, Russell Sage Foundation. 
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay in the Selection of Technical 
and Environmental Dangers, University of California Press. 
Elizabeth Fisher (2007) Risk: Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism, Hart. 
Anthony Giddens (1999) ‘Risk and Responsibility’ 62 Modern Law Review 1. 
Dominic Glover (2008) The Role of the Private Sector in Modern Biotechnology and Rural 
Development: The Case of the Monsanto Smallholder Programme, PhD thesis, University of Sussex.  
Jürgen Habermas (1998) ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy: Liberal, Republican, Procedural’, in 
Richard Kearney (ed), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Continental Philosophy, 
Routledge. 
Stephen Healy (2002) ‘Privileging Process over “Fact”: The Sydney Water Scare as “Organised 
Irresponsibility”’ 28(2) Science and Public Policy 123. 
Richard Hindmarsh (2008) Edging Towards Bioutopia: A New Politics of Reordering Life and the 
Democratic Challenge, University of Western Australia Press. 
LJ Hurst (2006) We Are The Dead. Nineteen Eighty-Four and Day of the Triffids, 
http://dialspace.dial.pipex.com/l.j.hurst/weredead.htm. 
Mark J Jamison (2005) Leadership and the Independent Regulator, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3620. 
Bruno Latour (2005) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Oxford 
University Press. 
776 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 3 
 
Charles Lawson and Richard Hindmarsh (2006) ‘Releasing GM Canola into the Environment: 
Deconstructing a Decision of the Gene Technology Regulator Under the Gene Technology Act 2000 
(Cth)’, 19(3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 22. 
B Leff, N Ramankutty and JA Foley (2004), ‘Geographic Distribution of Major Crops Across the World’ 
18 Global Biogeochemical Cycles GB 1009, doi:10.1029/2003GB002108.  
Karinne Ludlow (2004) ‘Cultivating Chaos: State Responses to Releases of Genetically Modified 
Organisms’ 9 Deakin Law Review 1. 
Bronwyn Morgan and Karen Yeung (2007) An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2005) Risk Analysis Framework. 
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2007) Risk Analysis Framework. 
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (2009) Risk Analysis Framework. 
Rosemary Robins (2002) ‘The Realness of Risk: Gene Technology in Germany’ 32(1) Social Studies of 
Science 7. 
Francine Rochford (2007) ‘The Law of Negligence in a “Risk Society”: Calculating Ideas of Reasonable 
Risk’ 16 Griffith Law Review 172.  
Ariel Salleh (2006) ‘“Organised Irresponsibility”: Contradictions in the Australian Government’s 
Strategy for GM Regulation’ 15(3) Environmental 399.  
Jason Silverman (2004a) ‘GMO Foes Turn to Film’ Wired, 7 August.  
Jason Silverman (2004b) Interview, July, www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/07/64089. 
Single Vision Grains Australia (2004) Towards a Single Vision for the Australian Grains Industry 2005–
2025, Grains Research and Development Corporation.   
Single Vision Grains Australia (2007) Delivering Market Choice with GM Canola, Grains Research and 
Development Corporation. 
Reports 
Explanatory Memorandum, Gene Technology Bill 2000, Commonwealth. 
Senate Community Affairs Committee (Cth) (2000) A Cautionary Tale: Fish Don’t Lay Tomatoes. A 
Report on the Gene Technology Bill 2000. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, 
Commonwealth (2000) Work in Progress, Proceed with Caution: Primary Producer Access to Gene 
Technology. 
Independent Panel Report to the NSW Minister for Primary Industries (2007) Gene Technology (GM 
Crop Moratorium) Act 2003 Review. 
NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 21 May 2001 (Ian Armstrong, Minister for 
Agriculture and Fisheries).  
Victorian Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (2007) Review of the Moratorium on GM 
Canola. 
Joint Select Committee, Parliament of Tasmania (2008) Gene Technology in Primary Industries. 
Legislation 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, included in Annex 1 of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 April 1994 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995) 
Control of Genetically Modified Crops Act 2004 (Vic) 
REYNOLDS: DETOXIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND DEFERRAL 777 
 
Directive 2001/18 (‘Directive 2001/18’ published in OJ of the EC No L 106 of 17.04.2001, p 1), On the 
Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council, 
Directive 90/220/EEC. 
Directive 90/220/EEC (‘Directive 90/220’ published in OJ of the EC No L 117 of 08.05.1990, p 15), On 
the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms. 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) 
EU Regulation 258/97, Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients (published in OJ of the EC 
No L 43 of 14.02.1997). 
European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006 (Final Panel Report) 
Gene Technology (GM Crop Moratorium) Act 2004 (ACT) 
Gene Technology (GM Crop Moratorium) Act 2003 (NSW) 
Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth)  
Genetically Modified Crops Free Areas Act 2003 (WA) 
Genetically Modified Crops Management Act 2004 (SA) 
Genetically Modified Organisms Control Act 2004 (Tas) 
